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Abstract: The challenge of effective merger enforcement is tremendous. U.S. antitrust agencies 
must, by statute, quickly forecast the competitive effects of mergers that occur in virtually every 
sector of the economy to determine if mergers can proceed. Surprisingly, given the complexity of 
the regulators task, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on the effects of mergers to guide 
regulators. This paper describes the necessity of retrospective analysis of past mergers in building 
an empirical basis for antitrust enforcement, and provides guidance on the key  measurement 
issues researchers confront in estimating the price effects of mergers. We also describe how 
evidence from merger retrospectives can be used to evaluate the economic models used to predict 
the competitive effects of mergers. 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily represent those of 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. We would like to thank 
Chris Taylor for his comments.   1
I.  Introduction 
The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice attempt to block or 
modify only those mergers that would reduce consumer welfare.  The challenge of 
effective enforcement is enormous.  The antitrust agencies have relatively little time to 
evaluate the likely impact of large changes in market structure on consumer welfare.  
Further, mergers occur in virtually every sector of the economy forcing teams of 
economists and lawyers to confront very different institutional details from one case to 
the next.  Surprisingly, given the complexity of the regulators task, there is remarkably 
little empirical evidence on the effects of mergers to guide regulators.  Empirical 
evidence on the price effects of consummated mergers can both determine whether past 
antitrust enforcement was applied correctly, and aid regulators in developing more 
effective techniques to forecast the likely effects of mergers on competition.  This paper 
describes the necessity of retrospective analysis of past mergers in building an empirical 
basis for antitrust enforcement, and provides guidance on the key measurement issues 
researchers confront in estimating the price effects of mergers.  We also describe how 
evidence from merger retrospectives can be used to evaluate the economic models used 
to predict the competitive effects of mergers. 
Determining the price effects of consummated mergers is difficult for several 
reasons.  First, calculating the effect of a merger on prices necessitates knowledge of 
what prices would have been had the merger not occurred.  These counterfactual prices 
are inherently unobservable, and assumptions that may be questionable must be made in 
order to identify and estimate these effects.  Further, prices are often difficult to measure 
in available datasets.  Difficulties in measuring prices can have important consequences 
on the results of merger retrospectives.  Finally, and as noted by Carlton (2009) and 
Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008), it is difficult to generalize from the results of even a 
large number of retrospective studies because only the price effects of consummated 
mergers are observed.  Mergers that are consummated represent a selected sample of all 
possible mergers, not a random sample.  Fortunately, a well designed study can overcome 
these three difficulties and much of this paper describes different approaches for doing 
so.     2
In addition to identifying whether past antitrust enforcement was at its proper 
level, retrospective analysis can also directly improve future antitrust decision making.  
Due to the costliness of dissolving consummated mergers, U.S. antitrust policy towards 
mergers is almost entirely prospective.  The government must forecast how each potential 
merger would affect prices and hence consumer surplus.  A large number of retrospective 
studies could aid government decision making by revealing what observable 
characteristics of mergers are associated with price increases.  Further, retrospective 
evidence provides a useful method for evaluating economic models used to forecast the 
competitive effects of mergers.  These methods include financial event studies, 
retrospective analysis from non-merger related activity, and simulations from structural 
oligopoly models (merger simulations).  A chief benefit of these methods is that they 
generate explicit predictions of the competitive effects of mergers, and in the case of 
merger simulations an explicit prediction of the price effect.  Further, the assumptions 
underlying these models are explicitly stated and, thus, can be subjected to rigorous 
review.  In contrast, the analysis of the evidence traditionally used in merger review, 
testimony of market participants and company documents, is inherently more subjective.  
Because economic models generate explicit predictions of the competitive effects of 
mergers, it is relatively straightforward (though resource intensive) to evaluate their 
performance with retrospective evidence.  If these tools are proven effective, they could 
lead to a more efficient, objective, and accurate merger review process. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II describes the decision 
problem of the antitrust authorities and discusses extant retrospective evidence, Section 
III describes the key issues in estimating the price effects of consummated mergers, and 
Section IV describes the economic models used to forecast price effects.  Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Antitrust Decision Making  
The Clayton Act forbids mergers that would “substantially reduce competition”.  
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice enforce the Clayton Act, and the protocol by which they do so is given in the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act).  In practice, the agencies seek to block mergers that   3
would reduce consumer surplus, primarily through higher prices.  The HSR Act requires 
parties engaged in commerce and acquiring assets valued at more than $65.2 million to 
file an intention to merge with the FTC and DOJ before coordinating their activities.  The 
firms must then wait while the merger is allocated to one of the agencies and investigated 
for potential anticompetitive effects.   
Because it is undesirable to delay efficient mergers, the HSR effectively forces 
the U.S. antitrust agencies to make decisions under strict legislated time constraints.  The 
HSR Act gives the government 30 days for its initial investigation.  If the merger is 
potentially problematic, the government issues a “second request” to the merging parties.  
The second request is a detailed subpoena requesting documentary evidence (including 
quantitative data) that is relevant to the government investigation.  While the merging 
parties do not face any formal time deadline to comply with the second request, it is in 
their interests to comply quickly so as not to delay the transaction more than necessary.  
After all documents are submitted for the second request, the government has a final 30 
days to review the case.   
The 1992 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide the analytic 
framework used in merger review.  In the course of its investigation, the agencies must 
define geographic and product markets, and then predict competitive effects, efficiencies 
and the likelihood of entry.  The information with which the government makes these 
decisions is limited.  Often government attorneys and economists are limited to the 
information contained in company documents and the testimony of merging firms’ 
executives and other market participants. When the merging parties have high quality 
price, quantity, and or revenue data, it is possible to use demand estimates and oligopoly 
models to help define product and geographic markets and simulate the price effects of 
mergers.   
The sheer magnitude of the number and variety of merger filings each year 
demonstrates the difficulties facing antitrust enforcers.  Figure 1 plots the total number of 
merger filings, measured on the left vertical-axis, and the total number of second 
requests, measured on the right vertical-axis.  While the vast majority of mergers are 
consummated without modification or review, on average over the past decade, the 
agencies conducted major investigations of mergers (that generated a second requests) 71   4
times a year.
2  Further, over the past decade, these mergers took place in roughly 80 
different industries, as defined by 3-digit NAICS codes.
3   






























































Thus, not only do the agencies have to review a large number of mergers in a 
short time period, they often are forced to make decisions with only limited exposure to 
the industry.  Industries differ dramatically in institutional detail critical for merger 
analysis.  Mergers take place in markets that differ in seller and buyer concentration, 
substitutability of different products, and barriers to entry.   
Studies of the price effects of consummated mergers provide a useful aid for 
government decision making.   Currently, there are about twenty published merger 
retrospectives, see Pautler (2001), Hunter et al. (2008), and Weinberg (2008) and for 
recent surveys.   The mergers that have been studied are not representative 
of consummated  mergers.  Instead  of  estimating the average price effect of a 
                                                 
2 HSR filing and second request figures are taken from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Reports to Congress.  
The drop in the number of filings and second requests after 2001 is due to both the end of a merger wave 
and also an increase in the HSR filing threshold from transactions valued at $15 million or more to $59.8 
million or more. 
3 3-digit NAICS codes for the merging parties are reported in HSR Premerger Notification and Report 
Forms.    5
merger, most studies focus on mergers that were likely on the enforcement margin.  For 
example, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) focus on five consumer product market mergers 
that took place in highly concentrated markets.  Thus the results of these studies should 
be interpreted as measuring the effectiveness of specific (non) enforcement decisions and 
not as the average price effect caused by a consummated merger.   In addition, most 
existing studies have taken place in four industries where pricing data are publicly 
available: airlines, banking, hospitals, and petroleum.  The vast majority of merger 
retrospectives find evidence of price increases, at least in the short period they observe 
post-merger pricing.  However, the number of merger studies is not large, they cover a 
time span of roughly 30 years, and only a handful of industries have been studied.  That 
being said, the main implication of this research is that mergers in concentrated markets 
can lead to price increases.  Given our limited knowledge it is impossible to draw broader 
conclusions about the effectiveness of enforcement or specific guidance as to what 
market characteristics are more likely to result in anticompetitive mergers.  
 
III. Generating Evidence to Improve Decision Making  
Merger retrospectives are useful for both evaluating past antitrust policy and in 
learning what types of mergers lead to increases in consumer prices.  As in all empirical 
analysis, for a study to yield useful results it is critical to have a sensible design and data 
sufficient to answer the question of interest.  Below we highlight what we see as the key 
issues in estimating the price effects of the merger.  First, and of primary importance, is 
developing a reasonable estimate of what prices in an industry would be had the merger 
not occurred.  Second, we discuss the importance of identifying a reasonable measure of 
price.  Finally, we discuss issues involved in identifying the time period in which we 
think the price effects of the merger would manifest themselves. 
 
Modeling the Counterfactual 
The goal of a merger retrospective is straightforward: learn if prices changed as 
the result of a merger.  A decrease in prices implies that the merger was efficient, and an 
increase in prices implies that the merger increased market power to the detriment of 
consumers (assuming no coincident increase in quality).  The major issue in estimating   6
the price effect of a merger, as with any evaluation of a change in a market using non-
experimental data, is the method used to control for other confounding factors that may 
also have changed at the time of the event.   Of especial concern in a merger setting is the 
effect of possible changes in demand or costs unrelated to the merger that may cause 
prices to change.  
For example, suppose a merger of two large gasoline refiners operating in the 
U.S. Midwest was consummated on January 1
st 2008.  The antitrust agencies are 
subsequently asked by the U.S. Congress to determine if that merger adversely affected 
consumers.  In response to this request the antitrust agencies ask their economists to 
measure the price effect of this merger.  The antitrust economists find that prior to the 
merger gasoline prices in the Midwest were roughly $3.03 a gallon the week before the 
merger was consummated, rose to $4.03 six months after the merger date, and then fell to 
$1.57 at the end of 2008.
4  Would it be correct to conclude from this price pattern that 
directly following the merger the gasoline refiners exploited their market power causing 
price to increase about $1 a gallon, however, by the end of the year (after the firms had 
time to integrate their facilities) the efficiencies were so great that prices fell to nearly 
50% measured relative to prices just before the merger was consummated?  This 
conclusion seems unlikely.  Variability in gasoline prices is largely caused by changes in 
crude prices.  Crude oil prices were roughly $96 a barrel on December 31, 2007, $140 a 
barrel on June 30
th, 2008, and $39 a barrel on December 31, 2008.
5  Thus, in this 
hypothetical merger retrospective relying on a simple “before and after” estimator would 
yield highly misleading results about the price effects of the hypothetical merger because 
the technique being used did not control for other factors (crude oil prices) that are 
important inputs into the production of gasoline.  While this example is highly simplified, 
it illustrates why a researcher must control for factors unrelated to the merger that may 
have affected prices.  In most studies, these factors typically consist of shocks to supply 
and demand. 
In a merger retrospective, the price effect of the merger is defined as the 
difference between the observed price following the merger and what prices would have 
                                                 
4 All prices are taken from the Energy Information Administration’s website, http://www.eia.doe.gov/. 
5 Prices of West Texas Crude, the most commonly traded crude in the US.     7
been “but for” the merger.  The typical merger retrospective assumes that there is a 
reduced form pricing relationship similar to equation (1) below in the markets affected by 
mergers.   
Mt 0 t M1 t (1) p  +  Post Merger M Mt α γα ε =+ +  
These studies assume that the price in the market affected by a merger (pMt) is a function 
of costs and demand factors which vary over time (γt), and an indicator (or series of 
indicators) corresponding to the post-merger period (Post Mergert).  Using a reduced 
form pricing equation, there are two dominant identification approaches used to estimate 
the price effect of a merger.  The first approach uses explicit controls for the cost and 
demand factors that affect prices independent of the merger.  In these papers, the 
researcher explicitly specifies both the factors that affect a product’s price and the 
functional form; i.e., the researchers explicitly specify γt as a function of observed cost 
and demand factors. 
An example of the first approach is the Chouinard and Perloff [2007] study of 
retail and wholesale gasoline price variation.  The goal of this study is to determine the 
relative importance of different factors that affect gasoline prices over time, including 
increases in market power caused by mergers.  Chouniard and Perloff use monthly state 
level gasoline pricing data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) from March 
1989 through June 1997.  They include a large number of variables that likely determine 
the supply and demand of gasoline over time in different U.S. states (γt in equation 1 
above).  Specifically, Chouinard and Perloff include variables that affect the demand for 
gasoline (including measures of income, weather, population, automobile ownership, and 
population density), input prices (crude oil prices, taxes, and controls for the type of 
pollution requirements in a given state), supply shocks (indicator variables for the first 
Persian Gulf war and refinery outages), and state fixed-effects (separate indicator 
variables allowing for a different price level in every state). Mergers are modeled as 
affecting price as in equation (1), a series of indicator variables for each merger where the 
indicator is equal to one in the post-merger time period for states affected by the merger.   
For this approach to generate reliable estimates of the price effects of a merger, it 
is critical that the variables included in the econometric model (the supply and demand 
variables) control for all important factors that affect prices and that may be correlated   8
with the timing of the merger.  If some factor that is not included in the regression causes 
prices to rise (or fall) in the post-merger period, the researcher would mistakenly attribute 
this unobserved factor as the price effect of the merger.  The validity of this approach 
depends on the application.  There are many regional factors which are very difficult to 
observe (much less measure) that can have a large impact on gasoline prices.  Because 
the supply and demand for gasoline are both very inelastic, unanticipated changes in 
output can have large effects on consumer prices.  For example, in the summer of 2000 
unanticipated decreases in output in the Midwest (caused primarily by unanticipated 
difficulties associated with meeting tighter environmental regulations) led to large price 
increases in the Midwest.
6 While large shocks can be controlled for by including 
indicator variables in the estimating equation (as done by Chouniard and Perloff), smaller 
disruptions to the gasoline distribution network (pipelines, barges) can also lead to 
significant changes in regional prices which, while transitory, can last for weeks or even 
months.
7  Thus, during the relatively short time horizon typically used to identify the 
price effect of a merger, one or two years, a cost shock could confound the ability to 
measure the price effect of a merger.  The validity of this modeling approach depends 
critically on the ability to specify the factors that affect the prices of the products affected 
by the merger. 
The second approach uses some form of a difference-in-difference estimator to 
identify the price effect of the merger and is the most common approach used in 
estimating the price effects of mergers.  Instead of explicitly specifying the factors that 
change the demand and cost of a product over time (γt), these studies identify a ‘control’ 
group of products that face similar demand and cost conditions to those potentially 
affected by a merger and then determine how those products prices change relative to the 
products sold in markets affected by a merger.  Specifically, assume that the process 
                                                 
6 Prices increased in Chicago and throughout the Midwest by nearly 60 cents a gallon in a little over a 
month, while more distant regions (connected by pipeline) experienced much smaller changes in price.  See 
Bulow et al. [2003]. Despite facing identical input (crude oil) costs, supply shocks in gasoline markets can 
lead to large changes in relative prices that can take weeks to dissipate. 
7 The price effects of a number of localized supply shocks are shown in Chapter 4 of United States Federal 
Trade Commission (2005).  
   9
causing prices to change over time in the control market is identical to that of the 
treatment market but for the price effect caused by the merger as in equation (2) below. 
Ct 0 t (2) p  +  CC t α γε = +  
In equation (2) prices of the control product are allowed to be different than those of the 
product affected by the  merger  by a constant amount (αC0), however, time varying 
factors affect prices in an identical manner as for the product affected by the merger.  
This leads to the estimating equation (3) which is the difference of equations (1) and (2). 
Mt Ct M0 C0 M1 Mt (3) p p (  -  )+  Post Merger ( ) MtC t α αα ε ε −= + −  
In equation (3) the intercept has the interpretation of being the difference in the pre-
merger price between the product affected by the merger and the control product, and the 
error term is the difference in the error terms in the two cities.   Under the assumption that 
the factors that causes prices to change for the two products are identical ()
MC
tt t γ γγ ==, 
this estimating equation yields the correct estimate of the price effect of the merger, αA1. 
The difficulty of the difference-in-difference approach is in identifying a good control 
product (or group of products
8) for the products produced by the merging firms.  In an 
antitrust setting, for example, there is often a tension between finding products that are in 
different geographic markets and therefore not affected by the transaction, while truly 
facing similar demand and cost conditions. 
Kim and Singal (1995) estimate the price effects corresponding to a number of 
airline mergers using a difference-in-difference approach.  They define a market as a city-
pair combination, for example, flights from Washington, DC to Chicago, Illinois.  Their 
goal is to estimate the change in price on city-pairs where a merger reduced the number 
of competitors.  A natural control group is a market containing the same number of 
competitors pre-merger with no reduction in competition post-merger.  By using this 
control group Kim and Singal are implicitly assuming that the factors that may cause 
airline prices to change over time independent of the merger, such as jet fuel prices or 
changes in wage rates, will affect merger markets and control markets similarly.  In their 
                                                 
8 This example has been presented in terms of a single merging firm product and a single treatment product 
to provide easy intuition.  In most applications, researchers estimate the price effects for multiple products 
using multiple controls.   10
paper the price effect of the merger is calculated as the (percentage) change in fares in 
markets affected by the merger relative to the change in fares in control markets.   
In many industries the approach used by Kim and Singal, of identifying a control 
market as a separate region selling identical products that is unaffected by the merger is 
not feasible.  Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008), for example, are interested in estimating 
the price effects resulting from five mergers of firms producing branded consumer 
products in the motor oil, breakfast syrup, ready-to-eat cereal, feminine hygiene products, 
and distilled spirits industries.  They observe retail prices for each brand sold in an 
industry across different regional markets before and after each merger occurred.   
Because each of these products is sold nationally, they cannot use prices of the same 
products sold in different regions as a control.  Instead, Ashenfelter and Hosken use 
private label products (products in the same industry sold under a retailer’s brand name) 
as a control group.  The key assumption for estimating the price effect of the merger in 
this context is that the merging brands’ prices would have changed in the same way as 
private label products in the absence of the merger.  Private label products have nearly all 
of the same production costs as branded products, except advertising.  For this reason, 
Ashenfelter and Hosken suggest that exogenous supply or demand shocks affecting the 
industry should affect private label and branded products’ prices similarly.  Further, 
private label products are likely relatively distant substitutes to the branded products 
produced by the merging parties.  Thus, we would not expect private label products to 
increase in price in response to an anticompetitive price effect generated by the merger.  
However, even if private label products are important substitutes for the branded 
products, the bias introduced by failure of the modeling assumption can likely be signed 
if firms compete in prices. Davidson and Deneckere (1985) analyze the price effects of 
mergers using the static Bertrand model which underlies most unilateral effects analysis.   
They show that for most common demand systems, firms producing substitute products 
to those of the merging firms will increase their prices following a price increase by the 
merging firms.  Thus, at worst, comparing the change in the prices of the merging firms’   11
products to the change in private label prices will underestimate the effect of the merger 
if the underlying model is Bertrand.
9 
  Whether it is best to control explicitly for supply and demand factors in 
estimating equation (1) or to identify a control product and estimate the price effects of 
the merger using a difference-in-difference estimator like equation (3) depends on 
characteristics of the merger being studied.  It is often difficult to identify variables that 
measure the factors that affect a product’s price over time.  For this reason, when 
analyzing mergers where a good control product is available, for example, estimating the 
price effects of an airline merger, a difference-in-difference estimator is likely best.  Even 
in these situations, however, a researcher should consider alternative controls where 
feasible to validate the assumption that the control and merger product face similar 
demand and supply shocks.  In industries where there is no obvious control, a researcher 
must identify the price effects of the merger by explicitly controlling for those factors 
affecting supply and demand in the estimating equation.  For example, many mergers in 
gasoline markets affect all cities in a region, and cities in regions unaffected by the 
merger may have different sources of supply and face different demand shocks (for 
example, weather). In this situation the best method for modeling the counterfactual 
would be to specify a model like that in Chounaird and Perloff.   
      
Price Measure 
Defining relevant products and their corresponding prices is almost always an 
important issue in antitrust analysis.  For example, even within relatively homogenous 
product categories, such as the retail sale of gasoline, prices can vary substantially within 
a region.  In order to describe the retail price of gasoline in a market some aggregation 
over products (gasoline sold at different retail outlets) is necessary.  Price measurement 
too can be an important issue in merger retrospectives. Researchers are constrained by 
available data.  Publically available data often contains a subset of transactions in the 
market.  Data corresponding to that subset may (or may not) be sufficient to determine 
                                                 
9 The result that rivals firms’ prices increase from the pre-merger equilibrium to the post-merger 
equilibrium in Bertrand models with product differentiation depends upon properties of the demand curve 
and the shape of the marginal cost curve.  If marginal costs are constant or increasing, a sufficient condition 
is that the cross derivative of demand is small.     12
the price effects of the merger.  The importance of price measurement can best be 
illustrated by examining recent studies estimating the price effects of mergers in the 
petroleum industry.  
The U.S. petroleum industry has undergone dramatic change over the last 15 
years.  Many well known petroleum firms have merged, including Exxon and Mobil, 
Conoco and Phillips, and Marathon and Ashland.  At the same time, many large 
petroleum firms have divested a substantial number of refineries to entrants and rivals.  
This merger activity in combination with dramatic volatility in the price of gasoline has 
led to concerns that these mergers may have harmed consumers.  A number of recent 
studies have estimated the price effects of mergers affecting the gasoline industry.  Some 
of these studies have focused on wholesale prices (Hastings and Gilbert 2004, GAO 
2004) while others have focused on retail prices (Simpson and Taylor 2008, Hastings 
2004) or both retail and wholesale prices (Chouinard and Perloff 2007, Taylor and 
Hosken 2007).  On initial inspection, the choice of price measure might not appear 
important in evaluating mergers in gasoline markets.  If a merger increased market power 
in the market for either the refining or distributing gasoline, then wholesale prices should 
increase.  The wholesale price increase, in turn, should be passed on to retail prices.  If 
retail markets are very competitive, we would expect something close to one-to-one pass 
thru of wholesale prices to retail prices. 
Some institutional factors in gasoline markets complicate this hypothesized 
relationship between observed wholesale and retail prices.   First, the specific wholesale 
price a gasoline retailer faces is determined by the vertical relationship between the 
retailer and the refiner supplying its gasoline.  There are four primary types of 
arrangements between gasoline retailers and suppliers, two of which are publically 
observable.  Gasoline stations that are independently owned and operated typically have 
the right to purchase gasoline at any wholesale distribution point.  If a gasoline station of 
this type sells a specific brand of gasoline, for example, Exxon, that station must 
purchase that brand of gasoline.  A station selling gasoline under its own name can 
purchase a generic gasoline.  These prices are typically referred to as branded and   13
unbranded “rack prices”
10 and are the only wholesale gasoline prices that are observable 
at high frequency (daily or weekly) for relatively narrow geographic regions 
(metropolitan areas).  Stations that are owned by a refiner but operated by a third party 
(lessee-dealer stations) also pay an unobserved wholesale price that may vary by station 
within a metropolitan area (often called a DTW price).
11 Finally, some gasoline stations 
are owned and operated by a refiner.  In this case the refiner directly determines the retail 
price, and the wholesale price is inherently unobservable.  Second, these different 
wholesale gasoline prices change relative to each other over time.  For instance, during 
supply disruptions refiners often increase the wholesale price charged to retail outlets 
unaffiliated with their brand relative to the price charged to stations selling their own 
brand of gasoline, see Bulow et al. (2003).  Similarly, DTW prices change relative to rack 
prices during supply disruptions, see Taylor and Hosken (2007).  Thus, at any point in 
time it is unclear which wholesale price (rack, branded rack, DTW, lessee dealer or 
unobserved transfer price facing refiner owned and operated stations) is the most relevant 
wholesale price in determining the retail price in a market.   
The choice of price measure can lead to different conclusions about the price 
effects of a merger. In 2004 the GAO issued a report analyzing the price effects of a 
number of mergers in the petroleum industry.  Their study examined how branded and 
unbranded rack prices changed in response to mergers.  The GAO found that the 
combination of Marathon and Ashland Petroleum caused a wholesale price increase.   
Taylor and Hosken (2007) also analyzed the price effects of this merger and examined 
both retail and rack prices.  Like GAO, Taylor and Hosken found that the observed 
wholesale price (rack price) increased, however, they did not find evidence of a retail 
price increase.  In fact, Taylor and Hosken find evidence that the observed increase in 
rack prices may have reflected a change in the relative size of the different wholesale 
                                                 
10 These wholesale prices are referred to as rack prices in the industry because they are the price charged at 
the truck rack where the gasoline is pumped into a delivery truck. 
11 This is often called a dealer-tank-wagon (DTW) price because the price of gasoline typically includes a 
delivery charge. Some independently owned stations enter into long term supply agreements with a refiner 
and pay a DTW price for gasoline.   14
prices.
12  Thus, this merger increased some, but not all wholesale prices and, on net, this 
change in wholesale prices did not cause retail prices to increase.  
While the above example is specific to the gasoline industry, most markets have 
idiosyncratic features that complicate price measurement.  In the hospital industry there 
are dramatic differences in the costs of serving patients depending on the type of care 
they receive.  In the retrospective analyses of hospital mergers researchers devote 
substantial effort to controlling for these costs.  Otherwise, they would not be able to 
determine if prices increased (or decreased) following a merger as a result of an increase 
in market power or a change in the composition of the patients treated by the hospital.
13  
Similarly, airlines charge many different prices for tickets on flights, often in response to 
flight specific demand shocks.  Researchers must carefully model this variation to avoid 
inadvertently attributing a supply or demand shock to a merger effect. 
 
Determining Pre and Post Merger Prices 
To measure the price effects of a merger, a researcher must specify the time 
periods corresponding to the pre and post merger time period.  The goal is to identify a 
time period sufficiently long to capture any change in price associated with the change in 
market structure, but short enough to avoid any contaminating effects from other changes 
in the market.  The pre-merger time period corresponds to the period directly proceeding 
the date at which firms change their pricing behavior.  While the HSR Act requires that 
the merging firms to operate independently during the government’s review of the 
merger, there is empirical evidence from both the banking (Prager and Hannan, 1998) 
and airline (Kim and Singal, 1993) industries that the merging firms increase their prices 
before the merger is consummated.  In other industries firms may be limited in their 
ability to change price for a significant time period following the merger.  Hospital 
prices, for example, are determined by contracts negotiated between hospitals and 
insurance companies for fixed time periods.  Following a merger, a hospital’s price will 
move to its post-merger level as its contracts with insurers are updated over time.  For 
                                                 
12 Taylor and Hosken note that DTW prices fell relative to observed rack prices suggesting that not all 
retailers felt a wholesale price increase. 
13 This issues is addressed at length in three recent hospital merger retrospectives Hass-Wilson and Garmon 
(2009), Tenn (2008), and Thompson (2009).    15
this reason researchers often exclude pricing for some period following a merger to 
obtain a more precise measure of the post-merger price, see, for example, Tenn (2009).  
In some cases where the merger leads to a discrete change in the level of prices, the event 
date might be determined through conventional structural break tests with unknown break 
date (see for example Andrews and Ploberger, 1994 and Bai and Perron, 2006).   
Alternatively, when the date at which the merged firm begin coordinating their pricing 
behavior is unknown and the researcher has a relatively long price series, observations 
near the consummation date could be dropped to generate reliable estimates of pre- and 
post-merger pricing, see, for example, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008). 
 
Selection Issues 
It is impossible to obtain a representative sample of all mergers because the government 
will attempt to block or modify those transactions believed to be anticompetitive.  This 
creates a challenge to both estimating the effects of a merger on price and evaluating 
whether enforcement activity is at its proper level (Carlton, 2008).  One approach to 
solving this problem is to focus on mergers that appeared to be on the enforcement 
margin.  This is the approach of Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008).  They identified five 
consumer product mergers that involved large firms operating in already highly 
concentrated industries.  While it may be that many approved mergers result in no 
competitive harm, four of the five mergers analyzed in their study resulted in moderate 
but statistically significant price increases.   
 
IV. Retrospective Studies for Merger Forecast Evaluation 
Antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers in the U.S. is largely prospective: 
regulators attempt to block those mergers predicted to increase price.  A growing number 
of papers have estimated the effects of different mergers on prices.  Unfortunately, given 
the heterogeneity across industries the number of merger retrospectives is far too small to 
make any inference on which market characteristics are correlated with price effects.  It is 
currently impossible to generalize from these studies to aid decision makers in 
developing current antitrust policy.  Instead, antitrust economists have relied on merger 
simulations, financial event studies, and retrospective studies of non-merger changes in   16
market structure to inform antitrust decisions.  All of these approaches require the 
validity of some strong assumptions if they are to yield accurate predictions.  Existing 
retrospective merger studies, however, can be used to evaluate the predictive ability of 
these different merger simulation methods.  This section describes different methods used 
to forecast the effects of mergers and how retrospective evidence can be used to evaluate 
them.   
When sufficient data is available, economists now commonly estimate static 
oligopoly models and then use these models to simulate the unilateral price effects of 
mergers in differentiated product markets.  These models focus on the incentive to 
increase prices after a merger that results from the internalization of consumer 
substitution.  Each firm has beliefs about the prices its rivals will choose and picks its 
own prices to maximize its profits given those beliefs, which are (in equilibrium) correct.  
When considering a price increase firms balance the benefit of larger margins on each 
product sold against the cost of lost consumers that switch to another product.  It then 
follows that if two separate firms respectively sell products that are the first and second 
choice of many consumers, a merger reduces the cost of a price increase and hence 
results in higher prices.  Models that formalize and then quantify this argument are 
known as “merger simulations”.  This approach was first taken by Baker and Bresnahan 
(1985) and, because the key ingredients in these models are consumer substitution 
patterns, modified versions have tracked developments in the demand estimation 
literature.  Key contributions to the literature include Hausman, Leonard, and Zona 
(1994), Werden and Froeb (1994), and Nevo (2000).   
Simulating the price effects of a merger requires several strong assumptions.   
Formally, the magnitude of the price increase in a unilateral effects model depends upon 
assumptions on consumer preferences and how the firms’ cost of producing a unit of its 
product varies with total output.  Simulating a merger also requires statistical 
assumptions that are necessary to estimate demand functions.  In addition, the standard 
unilateral effects model also assumes that price is the only locus of competition and that 
firms’ pricing decisions are static and thus independent of time.  The estimated model of 
oligopoly may predict inaccurate price effects of the merger if any of these assumptions 
are invalid.  Despite the huge amount of resources dedicated to merger review, only two   17
papers have used retrospective evidence to evaluate methods used to simulate mergers.  
Both of these papers have data covering a period before and after mergers took place.  
Using only pre-merger data that would be available during merger review, the price 
effects of the mergers are simulated.  Direct retrospective estimates of the mergers are 
obtained by adding to the sample post-merger data and the models are evaluated by 
comparing the indirect, simulated price effects to the directly estimated retrospective 
price effects.  
Peters (2006) evaluates merger simulation techniques by comparing the simulated 
and direct price changes from airline mergers.  He uses two different demand systems for 
fares, an assumption that the marginal cost of a fare is constant, and the assumption of 
static price competition to simulate 6 airline mergers.  While the direction of the bias 
depends on which of the two demand systems is used, the direct and the simulated price 
changes were on average 10 percentage points different from the actual price changes for 
both specifications.  Further, the simulations reverse the rank order of observed price 
effects.  In his study the merger predicted to generate the largest price increase 
(Northwest/Republic) yielded the smallest observed price increase.  Similarly the merger 
predicted to generate one of the smallest price effects (Continental/People’s Express) 
generated the largest price increase.   
Weinberg and Hosken (2008) evaluate merger simulations with retrospective 
evidence using data before and after two branded consumer product mergers occurred.  
They examined the merger of Pennzoil and Quaker State brand motor oils and an 
acquisition that combined Log Cabin and Mrs. Butterworth brand breakfast syrups.   Both 
of these mergers are particularly well suited to the assumptions required by the standard 
merger simulation: the products were well known to consumers, and there was no recent 
entry, exit, or product repositioning of any importance in either industry.  The results are 
similar to those of Peters in that the simulations reverse the rank order of the price 
effects.  Retrospective evidence reveals the motor oil merger was marginally 
anticompetitive while the syrup merger had no impact on prices.  The simulated price 
changes, on the other hand, were small for the motor oil merger and quite large in many 
specifications for the syrup merger.     18
Another method for forecasting the competitive effects of potential mergers is the 
financial event study approach of Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983).  The Eckbo and 
Stillman financial event studies of mergers examine the abnormal stock market returns of 
close competitors of the merging parties to determine if a merger is anticompetitive or 
not.  Assuming that financial markets are efficient so current stock prices incorporate all 
available information, events that impact the probability of a potential merger occurring 
will change current stock market returns in a way that identifies the competitive nature of 
the merger.  On one hand, an anticompetitive merger will increase rival firms future 
profits’ and thus increase the value of their equity.  On the other hand, a merger that 
lowers the marginal cost functions of the merging firms will decrease rival firms’ future 
profits and lower the value of their equity.  Therefore financial event studies provide a 
forecast of whether a merger will be anticompetitive or not, but do not forecast the 
magnitude of the merger’s price effect. 
McAfee and Williams (1988) evaluate the ability of financial event studies to 
predict whether mergers are anticompetitive with a case study.  They analyze the 1979 
merger of two microfilm producers, Xidex Corporation and Kalvar Corporation.  In an 
earlier paper, Barton and Sherman (1984) found that this merger led to large price effects.  
Therefore, if the predictions of financial event studies are accurate, pre-merger events 
that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the merger occurring should have led to 
positive (negative) abnormal returns of rival firms.  However, McAfee and Williams find 
that in most cases the exact opposite effects were found and that for nearly all 
specifications any merger effect from the financial event study was statistically 
insignificant.  They argue that financial event studies had little power because the 
merging firms in this study received only a small portion (less than 8 percent) of their 
total revenues from markets affected by the merger.  More evaluation studies like this of 
mergers of firms with overlap in product markets accounting for larger portions of their 
revenue would be valuable.   
In some cases past changes in market structure such as entry and exit of firms 
provide an alternative to merger simulation for forecasting the price effects of a merger.  
This type of analysis was presented by both parties in the proposed merger between the 
office supply retailers Staples and Office Depot and is described in Ashenfelter et al.   19
(2006).  The central evidence in this case was that prices were lower in geographic 
markets where both Staples and Office Depot operated than in markets in which only one 
of the two firms was present.  While suggestive, this observation is not persuasive by 
itself because whether both Staples and Office Depot or only one of the two were in a 
market is likely systematically related to other unobservable determinants of price such as 
costs or demand.  In light of this, the government used entry and exit to identify the effect 
of market structure on price.  If Staples would remove Office Depot from markets in 
which both firms compete after the merger was completed and there are historical 
instances of Office Depot exiting local markets where Staples also competed, then data 
on prices across different markets before and after exit occurred can be used to estimate 
the merger effect.  If entry and exit of Office Depot impact price in equal but opposite 
directions, then both entry and exit events could be used.  The key assumption needed to 
identify the effect of market structure on prices using entry and exit is that all 
unobservable determinants of price are constant over time within a market.  If a firm 
exiting the market affects prices differently from a merger, then entry and exit are not 
symmetric, or entry and exit are driven by other unobservable changes in demand or cost 
In this situation a study of entry or exit may yield biased estimates of the effect of a 





  Effective horizontal merger policy requires antitrust agencies to forecast the 
effects of mergers on consumer welfare.  Despite more than thirty years of active 
horizontal merger enforcement following the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino act, there 
is relatively little empirical evidence to guide policy makers on how mergers affect 
competition.  Antitrust enforcers and the courts largely rely on the testimony of economic 
experts, customers, company executives and company documents to forecast the impact 
of a merger on consumer welfare.  We believe that this information, while extremely 
useful, should be supplemented by gathering more evidence on the price effects of 
                                                 
14 In a recent study Manuszak and Moul (2008) also estimate a reduced form pricing equation  for Staples 
which allows for the endogeniety of market structure and find qualitatively similar results to Ashenfelter et 
al.    20
consummated mergers.  By focusing on mergers that were on the enforcement margin, 
researchers can begin to develop empirical evidence on which types of mergers are likely 
to be problematic and can provide useful guidance to aid merger enforcement.  More 
generally, economists have developed a number of models that predict the competitive 
effects of mergers.  Merger retrospectives can also be used to evaluate and potentially 
improve these tools. References
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